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Trademarks as Surveillance Transparency
Amanda Levendowski1
ABSTRACT
We know very little about the technologies that watch us. From cell site
simulators to predictive policing algorithms, the lack of transparency around
surveillance technologies makes it difficult for the public to engage in meaningful
oversight. Legal scholars have critiqued various corporate and law enforcement
justifications for surveillance opacity, including contract and intellectual property
law. But the public needs a free, public, and easily accessible source of
information about corporate technologies that might be used to watch us. To date,
the literature has overlooked a free, extensive, and easily accessible source of
information about surveillance technologies hidden in plain sight: federal
trademark filings.
This Essay examines the powerful and unexplored role of trademark law in
exercising oversight within and beyond surveillance. Trademark law promotes
access to information, and the federal trademark application process—long
overlooked by scholars—demands extensive public disclosures that reveal a
wealth of information about surveillance technologies. This Essay leverages
examples from real trademark applications to explore how journalists,
researchers, and civil society can use the detailed disclosures in trademark
applications for transparency. I conclude that trademark law can be a powerful
tool for correcting longstanding information asymmetries between the watchers
and the watched by empowering the public to watch back.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
In February 2018, Amazon acquired a “smart” doorbell company called Ring.2
For Amazon, a company that delivers more than 5 billion items annually,3
acquiring a way to monitor the real estate where packages are delivered makes
sense. Yet statements from the acquired Ring seemed grandiose for the purchase
of a private security system, including that the company “look[ed] forward to
being a part of the Amazon team as we work toward our vision for safer
neighborhoods.”4 Amazon’s full vision for Amazon Ring devices became clear to
the public more than a year later when journalists revealed that the company had
quietly partnered with police departments across the country to promote and
deploy Amazon Ring devices as part of a privatized surveillance network.5
Private companies, like Amazon, increasingly create surveillance technology
used by law enforcement, but the public is often not aware that these technologies
are being developed and deployed until the technology is already embedded in
communities. Private companies developing surveillance technology for law
enforcement is not new, and neither is the lack of transparency around those
relationships. Acquisitions of surveillance technology may be made with outside
funding or through in-kind donations to police departments, making surveillance
technology difficult to track through financial disclosures.6 Filing federal Freedom
Laura Stevens & Douglas MacMillan, “Amazon Acquires Ring, Maker of Video Doorbells,”
Wall St. J. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-acquires-ring-maker-of-videodoorbells-1519768639.
3
Ashley Carman, “Amazon Shipped Over 5 Billion Items Worldwide Through Prime in
2017,” The Verge (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/2/16841786/amazon-prime2017-users-ship-five-billion.
4
Eugene Kim, “Amazon Buys Smart Doorbell Maker Ring for Reported $1 Billion,” CNBC
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/27/amazon-buys-ring-the-smart-door-bellmaker-it-backed-through-alexa-fund.html.
5
Caroline Haskins, “Amazon Requires Police to Shill Surveillance Cameras in Secret
Agreement,” Motherboard (July 25, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb88za/amazonrequires-police-to-shill-surveillance-cameras-in-secret-agreement; Dell Cameron, “Amazon’s
Ring Barred Copes From Using ‘Surveillance’ to Describe Its Products,” Gizmodo (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://gizmodo.com/ring-barred-cops-from-using-surveillance-to-describe-it-1837380102; Drew
Harwell, “Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring Has Partnered with 400 Police Forces, Extending
Surveillance
Concerns,”
Wash.
Post
(Aug,
28,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-haspartnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/?noredirect=on. Earlier this year, the
House Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy sent a letter to Amazon requesting
detailed information about partnerships between Amazon Ring and law enforcement. See
Chairman Raja Krishnamoorthi, Letter to Brian Huseman Regarding Amazon Ring, H. Subcomm.
on
Econ.
&
Consumer
Pol.
(Feb.
19,
2020),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-0219.RK%20to%20Huseman-Amazon%20re%20Ring%20%281%29.pdf.
6
Laura Nahmais, “Police Foundation Remains a Blind Spot in NYPD Contracting Process,
Critics Say,” Politico (July 13, 2017), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/cityhall/story/2017/07/13/police-foundation-remains-a-blind-spot-in-nypd-contracting-processcritics-say-113361.
2
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of Information Act (FOIA) requests or using local public records laws to ask for
information about surveillance technologies used by law enforcement can be
resource intensive, and there is no guarantee that law enforcement will disclose
responsive documents about surveillance technology.7 Elizabeth Joh has detailed
how private contracts, such as non-disclosure agreements between police
departments and surveillance technology companies, can pose another roadblock
to transparency.8 And Rebecca Wexler has likewise documented the ways in
which trade secret law can operate to shield surveillance technology from public
scrutiny.9 Some jurisdictions have responded to this disparity by enacting
“procurement polices” for surveillance technologies, as Catherine Crump has
examined, but few jurisdictions have enacted policies that require public
disclosure of a proposed surveillance technology prior to procurement.10 The
reasons may vary, but the result is the same: there is a vast informational inequity
between law enforcement and the public about surveillance technologies.
Journalists and civil society have turned to other public sources of information,
such as Securities and Exchange Commission disclosures and patent filings, to
help correct informational disparities. SEC disclosures are often too general to
reveal useful information about surveillance technology products.11 And patent
filings are not a promise to produce a product, as Amazon pointed out when
confronted with a patent filing for a Ring-compatible expansion that would enable

See, e.g., Millions March NYC, et al v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, No. 100690 (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5684730/Nypd-Foil.pdf (denying New York City
Police Department’s Glomar response withholding responsive documents regarding surveillance
technology used during protests). For a thorough examination of the shortcomings of FOIA
requests, see Nate Freed Wessler, “[We] Can Neither Confirm Nor Deny the Existence or
Nonexistence of Records Responsive to Your Request”: Reforming the Glomar Response to FOIA,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1381 (2010); see also infra Part II. But see Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to
Algorithms, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that FOIA requests, state equivalents,
and the First Amendment may provide avenues for transparency regarding algorithmic
decisionmaking
tools
used
by
government),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355776. See also infra II. A.
8
Elizabeth Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924620.
9
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice
System,
70
STAN.
L.
REV.
1343
(2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920883.
10
Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1596
(2016), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2633/; see also Ira Rubinstein, Privacy
Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961 (2018), http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1853/93WLR1961.pdf (discussing procurement policies in Seattle,
Washington and New York, New York).
11
See, e.g., Amazon Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000101872419000004/amzn20181231x10k.htm (disclosing that Ring Inc. was purchased “for cash consideration of
approximately $839 million” for the primary reason, along with other acquisitions, of “acquir[ing]
technologies and know-how to enable Amazon to serve customers more effectively”).
7
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the cameras to create composite images of people to incorporate into a “database
of suspicious persons.”12
Taken together, surveillance transparency has never been more challenging.
Yet the public still desperately needs a freely available, easily accessible source of
information about the surveillance technologies that will be used to watch us if
there is hope for public discussion or dialogue before law enforcement embraces
these technologies. One source is consistently overlooked: federal trademark
filings.
Take Amazon Ring. In its August 2018 trademark application for the
AMAZON RING mark, Amazon publicly revealed its vision for Ring: “automated
self-contained electronic surveillance than can be deployed to gather evidence or
intelligence.”13 And it did so nearly a year before journalists detailed how that
vision would operate in practice.14
Federal trademark filings can offer important insight into the surveillance
technologies that private corporations are developing, but the public has not fully
explored the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) and Trademark Status
and Document Retrieval (TSDR) databases as joint pathways toward surveillance

12
Peter Holley, “This Patent Shows Amazon May Seek to Create a ‘Database of Suspicious
Persons’ Using Facial Recognition Technology,” The Washington Post (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/13/this-patent-shows-amazon-may-seekcreate-database-suspicious-persons-using-facial-recognition-technology/; see also Jacob Snow,
“Amazon’s Disturbing Plan to Add Face Surveillance to Your Front Door,” ACLU Speak Freely
Blog
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/amazons-disturbing-plan-add-face-surveillance-yo-0. For an accounting of why
technology companies continue to file for dystopian patents, see Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3202493 (examining
patents that contain fictional data) and Rose Eveleth, “Why Are There So Many Weird Tech
Patents,”
RealClear
Science
(Aug.
28,
2019),
https://www.realclearscience.com/2019/08/28/why_are_there_so_many_weird_tech_patents_287
296.html (assessing the incentives that fuel hypothetical patents).
13
AMAZON RING, 88075713, TEAS RF New Application (Aug. 13, 2018).
14
Compare Amanda Levendowski, “How Can We Learn About the AI Systems That Might
Be Used to Surveil Us? The Federal Trademark Register Has Answers,” AI Ethics Initiative (Oct.
11, 2018) (published less than a month after the AMAZON RING application was filed) with
Caroline Haskins, “Amazon Requires Police to Shill Surveillance Cameras in Secret Agreement,”
Vice Motherboard (July 25, 2019) (describing program discovered via public records requests
requiring local law e enforcement to “[e]ngage the Lakeland community with outreach efforts on
the
platform
to
encourage
adoption
of
the
platform/app”),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb88za/amazon-requires-police-to-shill-surveillancecameras-in-secret-agreement; Drew Harwell, “Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring Has Partnered with
400 Police Forces, Extending Surveillance Concerns,” The Washington Post (Aug. 28, 2019)
(detailing hundreds of partnerships between Amazon Ring and local law enforcement, offering
discounts to cities and community groups that invest public or taxpayer-supported funds on
Amazon Ring devices and potentially granting access to civilians’ home devices),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-haspartnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach.
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transparency.15 The reason is obvious. As Justice Samuel Alito observed, “[I]t is
unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the public has any idea what federal
trademark registration of a trademark means.”16
This is, in some part, attributable to the dearth of scholarly writing related to
the federal trademark registration process. As recently as 2017, Rebecca Tushnet
observed that the mechanics of trademark registration garner little attention—and
not much has changed in the interim years.17 This Essay delves into the largely
unexamined mechanics of the federal trademark registration process and analyzes
how the trademark application process compels companies to disclose details
about new surveillance technologies. In so doing, this Essay’s goal is to offer a
new tool in the quest for surveillance transparency and to equip the public,
including journalists, researchers, and civil society, with the skills necessary to
investigate the trademark register for themselves.
The Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I describes the federal trademark
application process and identifies three portions of trademark filings that are likely
to disclose information about surveillance technology: the use designation, the
goods and services description, and the specimen. Part II uses the trademark
applications for three surveillance technologies—Harris Corporation’s
STINGRAY cell site location information (CSLI) interceptor, Vigilant Solution’s
VIGILANT SOLUTIONS automated license plate readers, and Predpol’s
PREDPOL predictive policing software—to illustrate how to leverage revealing
disclosures in trademark filings for transparency. This Essay concludes that federal
trademark filings are a freely available, easily accessible way for the public to
learn about surveillance technologies used to watch us.

15

There are also 50 state trademark registers, each with their own rules and procedures and
processed, along with international registers, some of which are accessible online. See, e.g.,
eSearch Plus, European Union Intellectual Property Office (last accessed Jan. 5, 2020) (search
database for European Union trademarks, designs, owners, representatives, Bulletins, and Office
decisions), https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/ and TMview, European Union Intellectual Property
Office (last accessed Jan. 5, 2020), (search database for trademark names, applications, and
registration
numbers
in
additional
countries
and
databases),
https://www.tmdn.org/tmview/welcome.
16
Matal v. Tam, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1759 (2017) (citing App. of Nat’l
Distillers & Chemical Corp. 49 C.C.P.A. 854, 863 (1962) (Rich, J., concurring).
17
Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 871 (2017),
http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/867-941-Online-updated.pdf
(“Foundational critiques of modern trademark law tend not to address the role of registration…
Proponents of the Chicago School of law and economics approach, whose account of the function
of trademark as reducing consumers’ search costs is now dominant, likewise have little to say about
registration… American scholars, in sum, have often treated registration like a borrowed civil law
coat thrown awkwardly over the shoulders of a common law regime.”)
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II.

DISCOVERING DISCLOSURES IN TRADEMARK FILINGS
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination” of those
things that can be used to identify the provider or seller, and indicate the source,
of certain goods and services.18 As the Supreme Court has observed, “[f]ederal law
does not create trademarks.”19 Use of a mark can create a trademark and accrue
some enforceable rights,20 but the reality remains that federal trademark
registration confers crucial rights and benefits, such as providing constructive
notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership and offering prima facie evidence that
the registered mark is valid.21
There is ample scholarship about the purposes of trademark law.22 But as
Rebecca Tushnet has explained, precious little of that scholarship is dedicated to
the mechanics of federal trademark registration.23 Indeed, to date, there has been
no scholarship centered on the mechanics of investigating federal trademark
filings.
The federal trademark registration process begins with a trademark
application.24 An applicant discloses detailed information about the mark they are
seeking to register, including whether the mark has been used, the sorts of goods
and services on which the mark is (or will be) used, and, in some instances, a
depiction of how the mark is (or will be) used in the real world.25 Federal
“Trademark Basics,” U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (last accessed Sept. 22, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics.
19
Matal v. Tam, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
20
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (protecting qualifying unregistered marks from infringement,
dilution, and tarnishment); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (protecting qualifying unregistered marks
from cybersquatting).
21
Matal v. Tam, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017), quoting B & B Hardware, 575 U.S.
at — (2015) (detailing additional benefits of federal registration). Owners of a federally registered
trademark can also prevent importation of items bearing an infringing mark into the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 1124. The tremendous value of a trademark registration explains why, despite having
to reveal information about secretive surveillance technologies, companies continue to seek federal
trademark registrations for their marks.
22
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. LAW & ECON. 265, 296 (1987) (advocating an economic theory of trademark
law); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004)
(advancing a semiotic theory underlying trademark law); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007) (examining multiple
theories of trademark law, including preventing trade diversion, protecting consumers, and the shift
toward protecting marks qua marks).
23
Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern Trademark Law, 130
HARV. L. REV. 867, 870-71 (2017).
24
Perhaps the most complete judicial discussion of the trademark application and registration
process can be found in Kelly Services, Inc. v. Creative Harbor, LLC, 846 F.3d 857, 876 (6th Cir.
2017) (Batchelder, J., dissenting), https://www.leagle.com/decision/infco20170123094.
25
See generally “Apply Online,” U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (last accessed Jan. 5,
2010), https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/filing-online (outlining the forms
necessary to apply for a federal trademark online). The revealing disclosures demanded by the
18
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trademark filings are all freely and publicly searchable using the Trademark
Electronic Search System, or TESS. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
launched TESS in 2000.26 TESS offers a way to search federal trademark filings
online without cost and, while it does not require any technical expertise, it can be
a tricky interface.
There are two primary types of TESS searches: simple and structured.27 Using
the basic fields in both types of searches, searchers can surface trademark
applications for surveillance technologies through strategic queries. Simple
searches enable searching by limited criteria, namely by Combined Word Mark
(e.g., AMAZON RING), Serial or Registration Number (88075713), and Owner
Name and Address (Amazon Technologies, Inc., 410 Terry Avenue North, Seattle,
Washington 98109).28 Structured searches permit searching by a wider range of
search terms across many more fields, including Current Basis (1B, Intent to Use),
Goods and Services (surveillance), and International Class (Class 9).29 After
running a search using TESS, one can view each of the filings for a particular
trademark application using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval
system.30
Crucially, and unlike patent applicants, all federal trademark applicants must
make “bona fide use of the mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not simply
made to reserve rights in the mark.”31 Applicants who make misrepresentations
federal trademark application process incentivizes some companies to take advantage of the closed,
non-public registers of countries like Trinidad and Tobago—or the use of shell companies, as was
the case with the AMAZON RING filing—to protect their mark without disclosing detailed
information to the public about products or services in development. See AMAZON RING, Ser.
No. 88075713 (filed by “A9.com” and later assigned to Amazon, Inc. on May 15, 2019). These
methods allow a company to claim priority of the earlier foreign filing without disclosing details
about the mark—or the mark itself—until months later. For a detailed analysis of these so-called
“submarine trademarks,” see Carsten Fink & Andrea Fosfuri, et al., Submarine Trademarks (Feb.
15,
2019),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents/helmers_submarine_trademarks.pdf.
26
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, “USPTO Introduces New Trademark Electronic Search
System” (last accessed Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/usptointroduces-new-trademark-electronic-search-system. See also Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer,
Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congresion,
131 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 971 (2018) (discussing the origins of TESS).
27
Trademark Electronic Search System (last accessed Oct. 22, 2019),
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchss&state=4808:vxrviu.1.1. The third type of
search, free form, permits the construction of searches using Boolean logic across multiple search
fields. Id.
28
Trademark Electronic Search System (last accessed Oct. 22, 2019),
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchss&state=4808:vxrviu.1.1.
29
Trademark Electronic Search System (last accessed Oct. 22, 2019),
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchstr&state=4808:vxrviu.1.1. Infra I. A-C.
30
See Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR), http://tsdr.uspto.gov/. Note that there
are far fewer ways to run trademark searches using TSDR, which limits search fields to US Serial,
Registration, or Reference number or International Registration number. Id.
31
15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also TMEP § 901.02.
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during the trademark application process risk losing federal trademark protection
for their mark.32 Requiring that applicants must intend to use the mark in
connection with the goods and services identified in the application means that
trademark applications avoid the issue posed by dystopian patents that companies,
like Amazon, dismiss as speculative.33 The bona fide requirement forces
companies to stand by representations made in their applications, correct their
errors or admit to misleading the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Three portions of trademark applications predictably yield useful information
about surveillance technologies. The first is the “use designation,” which requires
the applicant to identify whether the mark is currently in use for the underlying
product or whether the mark is an intent-to-use application. The second is the
goods and services classifications and descriptions, which offer general
categorizations and specific identifications of the types of products for which the
mark will be used. And the final one, and perhaps the most unique and valuable,
is the “specimen” portion, which consists of visual representations depicting how
the mark is used in commerce—think screenshots of computer interfaces and
photographs of hardware emblazed with logos. This Part examines each of those
three portions of trademark applications in turn.
D. Intent to Use or In-Use Designation
Federal trademark filings require a designation regarding whether the owner is
currently using the mark in commerce or whether the owner intends to use the
mark at a future date.34 When viewing an application in TESS, these designations
are coded as filing bases 1A and 1B, respectively.35 For in-use applications, the
owner must disclose the date the mark was first used in commerce.36 The use
designation offers a way to determine when goods and services under a particular
mark were first offered to the relevant purchasing public, which, in some instances,
may be sales to law enforcement.
III.

GOODS
AND
DESCRIPTIONS

SERVICES

CLASSIFICATIONS

AND

See, e.g. Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Ahmad, Opp. No. 91177036, — U.S.P.Q.2d— (T.T.A.B.
2014) (sustaining fraud claim and refusing to register NATIONSTAR mark).
33
Supra Introduction.
34
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)-(b).
35
The 1A and 1B designations are named after the sections of the Lanham Act that govern
federal trademark applications. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)-(b). The intent-to-use designation was
introduced by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)
(1988). For skepticism about whether intent-to-use applications were an ill-advised addition to the
Lanham Act, see Amy B. Cohen, Intent to Use: A Failed Experiment?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 683
(2001).
36
15 U.S.C. § 1051(2). Six months after filing an intent-to-use application, the owner must
file a Statement of Use confirming that the mark is being used in commerce or risk abandoning the
application. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1). On a showing of good cause by the applicant, the Director of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may grant a series of six-month extensions, so long as the
overall extension does not exceed 24 months. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (d)(2).
32
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The goods and services classification and description portion of federal
trademark filings consists of two components: a numerical classification
categorizing the goods or services and a plain-language description of the goods
or services to be covered by a particular mark. The classification and description
requirement for federal trademark filings dates back to 1870 and the earliest
codified trademark law in the United States, which required applicants to identify
“the class of merchandise and the particular description of goods to which the
trade[mark] has been or is intended to be appropriated.37 Subsequent trademark
laws similarly required the identification of goods, although without
acknowledging protection for federal trademarks used in connection with
services.38 The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, finally extended trademark protection
to services.39
Federal law does not mandate a classification system, but the Director of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has determined one:40 the Nice
Classification, a numerical classification system featuring 45 distinct classes, with
so-called International Classes 1 through 34 identifying goods and International
Classes 35 through 45 identifying services.41 Class 1, for example, covers
“chemicals,” including those used in industry, science, photography, agriculture,
and forestry, among many others.42
Surveillance technologies are likely to fall into one or more of the following
classes: Class 9 covering electrical and scientific apparatuses, which includes
hardware and computer software (such as body-worn cameras43 or predictive
37

The Act made no mention of trademark in its title, ironically, but was rather intended to
“revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes relating to patent and copyright.” H.R. 1714, 41st
Cong. (1870). The first U.S. trademark law was struck down as unconstitutional after the TradeMark Cases in 1879, when the Supreme Court held that the Copyright Clause of the Constitution
did not give Congress the power to protect or regulate trademarks. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879). Subsequent trademark laws were enacted under the authority of the Commerce
Clause. TK.
38
See, e.g., 1881 Trademark Bill; H.R. 16560, 58th Cong. (1905).
39
Lanham Act; see also In re Dr. Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
40
15 U.S.C. §1112; T.M.E.P. 1401.02(a). Classifications are also the primary basis for
determining registration fees for federal trademark applications, with each class costing between
$225 and $400 depending on the type of trademark application. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
“Overview
of
Trademark
Fees”
(last
accessed
Oct.
28,
2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/fees-payment-information/overview-trademark-fees;
TMEP
1401.01.
41
TMEP 1401.02(a); see also the Nice Agreement. The United States became a signatory to
the Nice Agreement in 1973. See TMEP 1401.02(a).
42
TMEP 1401.02(a).
43
Taser International filed a trademark application for the AXON AI mark covering
“[s]urveillance services featuring use of video cameras that can be worn on the head and the body
and video surveillance systems used in automobiles, and computers and mobile electronic devices
to provide location-specific information about the video” on February 20, 2017—more than X days
before the rebrand from Taser to Axon was made public, teasing the company’s increasing focus
on software rather than hardware. Compare AXON AI, Ser. No. 87341984 (Feb. 20, 2017) with
Stephen Nellis, “Taser Changes Name to Axon in Shift to Software Services,” Reuters (Apr. 5,
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policing algorithms), Class 42 covering computer and scientific services (such as
developing big data analytics software) or Class 45 covering personal and legal
services (such as surveillance services or monitoring computer services for
clients).44 Goods and services descriptions offer additional detail about the goods
or services on which a mark will be used. Many model goods and services
descriptions are included the Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services
Manual (ID Manual),45 which operates as a guide for trademark applicants looking
to craft goods and services descriptions that will be intelligible to trademark
examiners and thus unlikely to create complications for the application.46
Applicants may try to disclose limited information in goods and services
descriptions, but such strategies are may limit the power of the mark and, in some
instances, trigger Office Action requests from the Examiner seeking information
about additional goods and services.47
Searches using classifications and goods and services descriptions are
“structured” searches within TESS.48 After selecting the option to begin a
structured search, users can search by classification by typing the desired class
number as the “Search Term” and selecting “International Class” as the field.49
Because a search premised on class alone is likely to return many irrelevant results,
one can further filter the search by typing key words from the goods and services
description, such as “surveillance,” as the Search Term and selecting “Goods &
Services” as the field.50 This search method is likely to yield surveillance
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taser/taser-changes-name-to-axon-in-shift-tosoftware-services-idUSKBN177265.
44
TMEP 1401.02 (a). Other possible, though less likely, classes for surveillance technologies
include Class 35 covering advertising and business services, Class 38 covering telecommunications
services, and Class 41 covering education and entertainment services. Id.
45
See Trademark ID Manual, ID Master List, https://idm-tmng.uspto.gov/id-master-listpublic.html (last accessed Oct. 10, 2019). The ID Manual can be used to identify how particular
goods and services related to surveillance are likely to be phrased; those phrases can then be
searched using TESS.
46
TMEP 1402.04. Applicants may create their own goods and services descriptions, but
trademark examiners may take issue with the specificity of the description or disagree that a
particular description is consistent with the identified class. In that case, the examiner may issue
an “Office Action” to the applicant suggesting revisions to the existing description or requesting
revisions from the applicant. See TMEP 705.
47
See generally TMEP 705.
48
See
Trademark
Electronic
Search
System
(TESS),
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4802:hy1kr4.1.1 (last accessed Oct. 10,
2019).
49
Trademark
Electronic
Search
System
(TESS),
Structured
Search,
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchstr&state=4802:hy1kr4.1.1 (last accessed Oct. 10,
2019). Note that classes must be stylized to three digits, such that a search for Class 9 would require
entering “009” as the Search Term. Id.
50
Trademark
Electronic
Search
System
(TESS),
Structured
Search,
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchstr&state=4802:hy1kr4.1.1 (last accessed Oct. 10,
2019). I am working with a Georgetown Law student to create a tool that automates this process
and generates an update when a trademark application containing “surveillance” in the goods and
services description is filed.
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technologies that may be used by law enforcement, such as the AMAZON RING
application.51
IV.
SPECIMENS
Trademark applications filed on an in-use basis must include a “specimen,”
meaning some kind of label, tag, packaging or other display that shows the mark
used in connection with every class described in the application.52 According to
the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, “[a]n important function of specimens in
a trademark application is, manifestly, to enable the PTO to verify the statements
made in the application regarding trademark use.”53 Effectively, specimens serve
as visual demonstrations that the applied-for mark is used in connection with each
class of goods or services identified in the federal trademark application.54
The type of specimen varies based on the goods or services on which the mark
is used. Specimens for hardware, for example, may take the form of commercial
packaging.55 Specimens for software, however, are likely to take the form of a
screenshot of the software interface or a website offering the software for sale.56
Although the contents of specimens are not searchable using TESS, specimens for
in-use applications or registered trademarks can reveal details about surveillance

51

See
AMAZON
RING,
Ser.
No.
88075713,
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4810:aa6hai.2.1 (covering, in part,
“security surveillance apparatus, namely, electronic components of security systems,” “software
development kits (SDKs) comprising of software development tools and software for use as an
application programming interface (API) for creating software and applications related to theftprevention and security systems, and home and business surveillance systems,” “electronic video
surveillance products, namely, electronic components of security systems; global positioning
navigation software for use with smart, autonomous vehicles and mobile machines for use in
connection with internet of things (IoT) enabled devices,” and “Automated self-contained
electronic surveillance devices that can be deployed to gather evidence or intelligence,” all in Class
9).
52
TMEP 904.03. All marks will eventually include a specimen, but specimens are only
required for applications filed on an in-use basis. Id. Searching for trademark applications that
include a specimen requires a Structured Search in TESS, in which the Search Term is “1A” and
the Field is “Current Basis.”
53
Application of Bose Corp., 546 F.2d 897 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1976). The Federal Circuit has
made similar observations. See In re Sones, 590 F.3d at 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (TK).
54
TMEP 904.01. The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure offers extensive guidance
about the forms that certain specimens may take.
55
TMEP 904.03(c).
56
TMEP 904.03(e); In re Azteca Sys., Inc. 102 USPQ2d 1955 (TTAB 2012). Screenshots of
websites merely advertising the software are insufficient as specimens. TMEP 904.03(e).
Similarly, displays associated with goods, including advertising and promotional materials, are not
“per se ‘displays’” that qualify as sufficient specimens. See 904.03(g).
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technologies, from the physical configuration of surveillance hardware,57 to the
features of surveillance software,58 to the location of law enforcement customers.59
V.

REVEALING DISCLOSURES
TECHNOLOGIES

IN

TRADEMARK FILINGS

FOR

SURVEILLANCE

Revealing a surveillance technology using federal trademark filings opens new
avenues for journalists, researchers, and civil society to leverage those disclosures.
One may discover that a surveillance technology is in development before there
has been a public announcement.60 One may uncover a surveillance technology
whose existence has been obfuscated by non-disclosure agreements between a
company and law enforcement.61 One may find that the maker of a surveillance
technology potentially exposed personal information about a target publicly. 62 Or
one may unearth the terms of the financial arrangement between a company and
law enforcement.63 Each revelation presents a new opportunity to bring new
information about surveillance technologies to light.
These use examples form the basis of three case studies of Harris
Corporation’s STINGRAY mark, Vigilant Solution’s VIGILANT SOLUTIONS
mark, and PredPol’s PREDPOL mark. This Part explores these case studies using
real trademark filings to illustrate how trademarks can be a source of transparency
about surveillance technology, even when other transparency mechanisms fall
short.
E. STINGRAY: Cell-Site Location Information Interceptors
Modern mobile phones disclose a significant amount of sensitive personal
information, from who we call and how long we talk to them to our real-time
locations. With that wealth of information at the ready, it is not surprising that law
enforcement has an interest in capturing these details at the source.64 Enter cellsite location information interceptors, or CSLI interceptors.65 CSLI interceptors
mimic cell phone communications towers in such a way that all nearby cell phones,

57

Infra Part II.A.
Infra Part II.B. and Part II.C.
59
See, e.g., SHOTSPOTTER, Reg. No. 3896150, Specimen (Feb. 25, 2016) (featuring a map
identifying more than 50 cities across the United States, Brazil, Panama, and the United Kingdom
using ShotSpotter technology, along with the years those cities began using the technology).
60
See, e.g. Introduction.
61
Infra Part II.A.
62
Infra Part II.B.
63
Infra Part III.C.
64
Larry Greenemeier, “What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance,” Scientific
American (June 25, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secretsurrounding-stingray-surveillance/.
65
For a discussion of the detailed information that can be revealed by CSLI, see Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 at 13 (2018).
58
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including those of innocent passersby, are “tricked” into communicating with an
interceptor rather than a cell tower operated by a telecommunications provider.66
Harris Corporation, a defense contractor based in Melbourne, Florida,67 makes
one of the most popular CSLI interceptors, sold under the brand name
STINGRAY.68 The Stingray device has become so popular that “stingray” is often
used generically to refer to the whole class of technologies known as CSLI
simulators.69 Since introducing the Stingray device, Harris Corporation has taken
steps to avoid transparency about its surveillance technology. Information about
Stingray devices was not available on the Harris Corporation website, and
marketing materials came with warnings that distribution outside law enforcement
or telecommunications firms could be a crime, punishable by up to five years in
prison.70 Harris Corporation petitioned the Federal Communications Commission
to prevent disclosure of Stingray user manuals in response to public records
requests.71 The company even went so far as to demand that law enforcement using
Stingray devices agree and adhere to strict non-disclosure agreements prohibiting
Ryan Gallagher, “Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data,” Ars Technica (Sept.
25,
2013),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-yourphones-data/.
67
Harris Corporate Headquarters, https://www.harris.com/locations.
68
STINGRAY, Reg. No. 2762468 (Sept. 9, 2003). Harris Corporation makes many other
pieces of surveillance technology, including DENALI (Class 9 covering, in part, “firmware
installable in communications transceivers for enabling such transceivers to encrypt and decrypt
information communicated via the transceivers”), Reg. No. 5628200 (Dec. 11, 2018) and
KINGFISH (Class 9, covering “electronic surveillance transceivers for tracking, locating and
gathering information from cellular telephones”), Reg. No. 2857227 (July 27, 2004).
69
See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, “‘Stingray’ Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional
Clash,”
Wall
St.
Journal
(Sept.
22,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904194604576583112723197574;
Ryan
Gallagher, “Meet the Machines That Steal Your Phone’s Data: Keeping Tabs on Civilian Phones?
There’s More Than One Way to Skin That Cat,” Ars Technica (Sept. 25, 2013),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/
(noting that the term “stingray” is used generically). For a discussion of the significance of
genericide in trademark law, see TK.
70
Ryan Gallagher, “”Meet the Machines That Steal Your Phone’s Data,” Ars Technica (Sept.
25,
2013),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-yourphones-data/.
71
Letter from Tania W. Hannah to Chief Julius P. Knapp, Request for Confidentiality of Harris
Corporation for FCC ID Nos. NK73092523, NK73100176, NK73166210 (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://www.scribd.com/document/259988405/Harris-Letter-Response-Request-forConfidentiality-FOIA-2014-669; “Exclusive: Stingray Maker Asked FCC To Block Release of Spy
Gear Manual,” The Blot (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.theblot.com/exclusive-stingray-makerasked-fcc-to-block-release-of-spy-gear-manual-7739514. See also Nate Freed Wessler & Nicole
Ozer, “Documents Suggest Maker of Controversial Surveillance Tool Misled the FCC,” Free
Future (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/documents-suggest-maker-controversialsurveillance-tool-misled-fcc?redirect=blog/national-security/documents-suggest-makercontroversial-surveillance-tool-misled-fcc (observing that Harris claimed that its Stingray
technology would only be used for emergencies when records released by the Tallahassee, Florida
Police Department suggest that only 29% of cases in which a Stingray was used involved
“emergencies”).
66
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those agencies from disclosing any details about Harris equipment—even to
judges.72
Perhaps Harris Corporation’s dedication to avoiding transparency explains
why it took some time for the first federal case to mention Stingray devices.73 In
United States v. Allums, the defendant, James Edward Allums, was charged with
three robberies, in part based on the CSLI of Allums’ cell phone.74 As Judge
Stewart explained, the government used a phone and “another device called a
Stingray, which also tracked which cell tower was the strongest at any
geographical position,” to identify the location of Allums.75 The unpublished
memorandum decision was released in 2009, and it took until 2014 for the
American Civil Liberties Union to use public records request to obtain emails (also
written in 2009) revealing that law enforcement in Florida had been misleading
judges, defense counsel, and defendants about the use of Stingray devices.76
If someone had been scanning federal trademark filings, however, the public
would have known about the existence of Stingray devices nearly a decade
sooner.77 On August 21, 2001, Harris Corporation filed a federal trademark
application for the STINGRAY mark.78 The mark was filed with an intent-to-use
72

See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 127 So.3d 658, 660 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that local
police department “did not obtain a search warrant because they did not want to reveal information
about the technology they used to track the cell phone signal” due to a non-disclosure agreement
with Harris Corporation). See also Kim Zetter, “Police Contract with Spy Tool Maker Prohibits
Talking About Device’s Use,” Wired (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/harrisstingray-nda/; Spencer McCandless, Note, Stingray Confidential, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993
(2017), http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/85-Geo.-Wash.-L.-Rev.-993.pdf.
73
United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS (D. Utah, Mar. 24, 2009). The Rigmaiden case,
which involved a pro se defendant who successfully demonstrated that a warrantless cell-site
location information interceptor was used to investigate his case, is often identified as the first case
to publicly reveal the existence of Stingray devices—but the final decision, which discussed
Stingray devices, was not decided until 2013. States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz.
May 8, 2013). That said, similar devices were in use well before 2009—the Harris Corporation’s
Triggerfish device was promoted as early as 1991. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A
Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less Than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About
How Congress Should Approach Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE
J. L. & TECH. 134 (2014); see also Tsutomu Shiomura, “Catching Kevin,” Wired (Feb. 1, 1996),
https://www.wired.com/1996/02/catching/ (describing how a cell-site simulator was used to track
hacker Kevin Mitnick, along with a Triggerfish device). The earliest trademark application for the
TRIGGERFISH mark was filed in 2001. TRIGGERFISH, Reg. No. 2534253 (Jan. 29, 2002)
(cancelled Oct. 31, 2008).
74
United States v. Allums, No. 2:08-CR-30 TS at 1 (D. Utah, Mar. 24, 2009).
75
Allums, note.
76
Maria Kayanan, “Internal Police Emails Show Efforts to Hide Use of Cell Phone Tracking,”
ACLU Free Future (June 19, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-andsurveillance/internal-police-emails-show-efforts-hide-use-cell?redirect=blog/national-securitytechnology-and-liberty/internal-police-emails-show-efforts-hide-use-cell.
77
Harris Corporation also patented the Stingray device even earlier than filing its trademark
application.
U.S.
Patent
No.
5428667A
(June
27,
1995),
https://patents.google.com/patent/US5428667A/en.
78
STINGRAY, Reg. No. 2762468 (Sept. 9, 2003).
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designation, with the first use date of March 2, 2003.79 As registered, the mark
covers “multi-channel, software-defined, two-way electronic surveillance radios
for authorized law enforcement agencies for interrogating, locating, tracking and
gathering information from cellular telephones” in Class 9.80 The specimen depicts
an actual Stingray device, emblazed with the logo, and depicting the inputs and
outputs embedded in the device.81

Using federal trademark filings, the public could have learned about the
existence of CSLI interceptors nearly a decade before the first federal court
decision disclosing the existence of Stingray devices.
F. VIGILANT SOLUTIONS: Automated License Plate Readers
Private corporations are regularly taking photographs of cars, trucks, and other
automobiles to sell to law enforcement. These companies mount small high-speed
cameras called automated license plate readers, or ALPRs, on moving police
vehicles or stationary infrastructure like bridges or roads,82 which then photograph
79

STINGRAY, Reg. No. 2762468 (Sept. 9, 2003).
STINGRAY, Reg. No. 2762468 (Sept. 9, 2003).
81
STINGRAY, Reg. No. 2762468, Specimen (June 18, 2003). Note that the specimen was the
second specimen submitted; the prior specimen borders on illegible due to the quality of the images
included. See STINGRAY, Reg. No. 2762468 (June 5, 2003).
82
Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, “Homeland Security is Seeking a National License Plate
Tracking System,” Wash. Post, (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national80
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up to thousands of license plates per minute.83 The photographs are then stored in
searchable databases used by law enforcement.84 According to the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, law enforcement agencies can use ALPRs to
“enhance their enforcement and investigative capabilities, expand their collection
of relevant data, and expedite the tedious and time consuming [sic] process of
comparing vehicle license plates with lists of stolen, wanted, and other vehicles of
interest.”85 ALPRs also enable surveillance by empowering law enforcement to
track a single vehicle across cities and states with no suspicion of wrongdoing—a
task that would be challenging, if not impossible, for someone peeking out of a
window and jotting down license plate numbers.86
ALPR databases can be abused.87 In 2016, for example, a Washington D.C.
police officer pleaded guilty to extortion after blackmailing car owners whose
vehicles were identified near a gay bar.88 The year before, a SWAT team
mistakenly raided a man’s house searching for a marijuana-growing operation
because of license plate monitoring at a garden store but found no evidence of such
an operation.89 And the year before that, police removed a woman from her car at

security/homeland-security-is-seeking-a-national-license-plate-trackingsystem/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-9616d367fa6ea99b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.876d14309e14.
83
American Civil Liberties Union, “Automatic License Plate Readers,”
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/automatic-license-plate-readers
(last accessed Mar. 20, 2018).
84
See
generally
Vigilant
Solutions,
“Vigilant
Platesearch™,”
https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/license-plate-recognition-lpr/ (last accessed Feb. 22,
2020) (describing how Vigilant Solutions’ automated license plate reader technology is housed in
a cloud database that can be shared with law enforcement to “reinforc[e] the thin blue line”).
85
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Automated License Plate Recognition,”
https://www.theiacp.org/projects/automated-license-plate-recognition (last accessed Mar. 20,
2018).
86
For a comprehensive exploration of local law enforcement use of ALPRs and the
transparency challenges posed by those relationships, see Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law
Enforcement Jumps on the Big Data Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems,
Information Privacy, and Access to Government Information, 66 MAINE L. REV. 398 (2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341182.
87
Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, “New Tracking Frontier: Your License
Plates,”
Wall
St.
Journal
(Sept.
29,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443995604578004723603576296.
88
Anthony D. Romero, “Documents Uncover NYPD’s Vast License Plate Reader Database,”
Huffington Post, (Jan. 25, 2016, updated Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/marikohirose-/documents-uncover-nypds-v_b_9070270.html; see also Mariko Hirose, “Documents
Uncover NYPD’s Vast License Plate Reader Database,” Free Future Blog,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/documents-uncover-nypds-vastlicense-plate-reader-database (Jan. 25, 2016).
89
Radley Balko, “Federal Judge: Drinking Tea, Shopping at a Gardening Store is Probable
Cause for a SWAT Raid on Your Home,” Wash. Post (Dec. 28, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/28/federal-judge-drinking-teashopping-at-a-gardening-store-is-probable-cause-for-a-swat-raid-on-yourhome/?utm_term=.44d1bc082ee9. Anthony D. Romero, “Documents Uncover NYPD’s Vast

16
[DRAFT 2/25/2020]

gunpoint on the mistaken belief that she was driving a stolen car after a license
plate reader had misread her plates.90
Most states do not regulate ALPRs.91 But sixteen states, including California,
Florida, Maryland, and Vermont, do have laws regarding license plate readers and
data retention.92 These laws can still be insufficient to deter misconduct. Just this
year, a California auditor discovered widespread issues with use of license plate
readers across in the state, from insecurely storing data to sharing images with
thousands of entities across the United States without determining whether those
entities had a right or need to access the images.93
One of the leading ALPR vendors is Vigilant Solutions, a company based in
Livermore, California.94 Vigilant Solutions takes information that can be
unwieldly to manage and collect—like photographs of license plates—and
assembles that information into databases for private clients.95 In its marketing
materials, Vigilant Solutions advertises that its license plate recognition cameras
take photographs of license plates along with the date, time, and GPS coordinates
of where a particular vehicle was photographed.96 Chris Metexas, a chief executive
for Vigilant Solutions subsidiary DRN, compared the company’s work to “a guy
holding his head out the window, looking down the block, and writing licenseplate numbers down and comparing them against a list. The technology just makes

License Plate Reader Database,” Huffington Post (Jan. 25, 2016, updated Jan. 26, 2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mariko-hirose-/documents-uncover-nypds-v_b_9070270.html.
90
Kade Crockford, “San Francisco Woman Pulled Out of Car at Gunpoint Because of License
Plate Reader Error,” ACLU Free Future (May 13, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/location-tracking/san-francisco-woman-pulled-out-car-gunpoint-because.
91
Id.
92
National Conference of State Legislatures, “Automated License Plate Readers: State
Statutes,” http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/statestatutes-regulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alpr-data.aspx
(last
updated Mar. 15, 2019). Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah also have ALPR laws. Id.
93
Elaine M. Howle, Report No. 2019-118, “Summary of Automated License Plate Readers:
To Better Protect Individuals’ Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data
It
Collects,”
Auditor
of
the
State
of
California
(Feb.
13,
2020),
https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports/2019-118/index.html.
94
Vigilant
Solutions,
“About”
(last
accessed
July
29,
2019),
https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/about/. Based on its website, Vigilant Solutions is expanding
into facial recognition technology. See Vigilant Solutions, “Vigilant Facesearch™” (last accessed
Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/facial-recognition/. See also
Facesearch,
Vigilant
Solutions
(last
accessed
July
30,
2019),
https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/facial-recognition/.
95
Dan Froomkin, “Reports of the Death of a National License-Plate Tracking Database Have
Been Greatly Exaggerated,” The Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2014/03/17/1756license-platetracking-database/ (Mar. 17, 2014) (detailing the national network of license plate databases).
96
Vigilant Solutions, Platesearch™, https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/licenseplate-recognition-lprr/ (last accessed Mar. 20, 2018).
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things better and more productive.”97 Vigilant Solutions’ technology certainly
makes surveillance easier: Vigilant Solutions advertises that its commercial
dataset offers more than 5 billion license plate detections, with more than 150
million plates added each month.98
Discovering information about ALPRs can be challenging. In 2018, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) used public records requests to find out more
information about the procurement and deployment of ALPRs. EFF partnered with
Muckrock—a nonprofit organization dedicated to public records requests—to file
a series of requests to gather details about more than 200 cities’ ALPR programs.99
Responses to these requests revealed that fewer than 1% of the 2.5 billion license
plates scanned in the years 2016 and 2017 were linked to cars under any suspicion
at the time the plates were captured.100 EFF concluded that law enforcement
agencies shared their data with a minimum of 160 other agencies, all through
Vigilant Solutions’ LEARN program, an acronym for Law Enforcement Archival
and Reporting Network.101
Vigilant Solutions has two federally registered trademarks. One is a design
mark for a three-part disjointed V with the words VIGILANT SOLUTIONS
stacked on top of one another to the right of the V, was filed on June 26, 2014.102
The VIGILANT SOLUTIONS design mark covers “computer hardware and
software in the fields of law enforcement and crime prevention for identifying
human faces and vehicle license plates, for tracking vehicles over time and

Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, “Homeland Security is Seeking a National License Plate
Tracking
System,”
Wash.
Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/homeland-security-is-seeking-a-national-license-plate-trackingsystem/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-9616d367fa6ea99b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f3cc52f1b583 (Feb. 18, 2014).
98
Id.
99
David Maass & Beryl Lipton, “EFF and MuckRock Release Records and Data from 200
Law Enforcement Agencies’ Automated License Plate Reader Programs,” EFF
Deeplinkshttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/11/eff-and-muckrock-release-records-and-data200-law-enforcement-agencies-automated (Nov. 15, 2018); see also Cory Doctorow, “Here’s the
Secret Details of 200 Cities’ License-Plate Tracking Programs,” Boing Boing,
https://boingboing.net/2018/11/15/find-yourself-a-city-to-live-i.html (Nov. 15, 2018).
100
David Maass & Beryl Lipton, “Data Driven: Explore How Cops Are Collecting and Sharing
Our
Travel
Patterns
Using
Automated
License
Plate
Readers,”
EFF,
https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-reader-dataset.
101
David Maass & Beryl Lipton, “Data Driven: Explore How Cops Are Collecting and Sharing
Our
Travel
Patterns
Using
Automated
License
Plate
Readers,”
EFF,
https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-reader-dataset. Vigilant Solutions has been
unimpressed by EFF’s investigations into its technology and policies. See, e.g., Susan Crandall,
“EFF: Stop Creating Fake News and Scaring People!” Vigilant Solutions (July 12, 2018),
https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/eff-stop-creating-fake-news-scaring-people/ (responding to
EFF investigation that linked a Vigilant Solutions Customer that manages several California malls
of sharing vehicle data with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)).
102
VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, Reg. No. 4780381 (July 28, 2015).
97
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geographic location, and for producing reports on the movements of specific
vehicles” in Class 9.103
But it’s the VIGILANT SOLUTIONS specimen that is especially revealing: it
features what appears to be authentic geolocation data linked to real license plate
numbers:

Vigilant Solutions appears to have submitted an image from its LEARN database
depicting four license plate numbers, all of which are clearly visible in the
specimen.104 The specimen also appears to reveal the precise latitude and longitude
data for a specific license plate number.105 According to the specimen, the plate
was identified through private data and a private system on Dam Neck Road in
Virginia Beach, Virginia.106 The specimen includes a visualization of the
location.107
The other, earlier registration is for the image of a disjointed V, filed on August
13, 2013.108 The mark covers “[c]omputer hardware and software in the fields of
security and law enforcement for tracking vehicles over time and geographic
103
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location and for producing reports on the movements of specific vehicles” in Class
9.109
The specimen appears to show an interface for a “Vigilant Stakeout - Report”
and depicts an exact address in Homestead, Florida.110 Visit number 21 is
highlighted with 531 plates scanned, but the target plate does not appear to have
been scanned.111 The bottom of the specimen features five images of car bumpers,
each featuring their respective license plate numbers, as well as the date and time
the cars were scanned.112

Vigilant Solutions’ trademark filings offer an additional approach to
surveillance transparency, in which the public reveals that a company may have
failed to protect the sensitive information that it collects.113 There has already been
backlash to the deployment of ALPRs in communities without public approval,
and these specimens may further fuel transparency by offering journalists and civil
liberties organizations an alarming new talking point.
G. PREDPOL: Predictive Policing Algorithms
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Predictive policing, as Andrew Guthrie Ferguson describes it, “involves
computer models that predict future crime locations from past crime statistics and
other data.”114 PredPol describes itself as the market leader in predictive policing
technology.115 The “past crime statistics and other data” used by PredPol are
victimization data, meaning crimes that have been reported to law enforcement.116
PredPol is not without controversy. Relying on crime data that reflects
systemic bias as training data, so-called “dirty data,” may have the effect of
amplifying those biases.117 PredPol is a private company, developed from research
conducted by the University of California, Los Angeles and the Los Angeles
Police Department,118 but only individuals who have financial interests in PredPol
have conducted research on the company’s methodology.119
Some jurisdictions, like the Los Angeles Police Department, have been candid
and forthcoming about their use of PredPol algorithms to evaluate crimes. Others
have been far less transparent. In 2018, a security researcher used a series of
domain-name logins to identify a dozen cities with previously undisclosed
relationships with PredPol.120 Two researchers sent public records requests to
eleven police departments—eight declined to respond or acknowledged the
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request without producing any responsive documents.121 One city stated that “[t]he
City Attorney has advised that information revealing surveillance techniques,
procedures or personnel is exempt from public inspection pursuant to S.
119.071(2)(d), Florida statutes.”122 Neither investigation revealed a relationship
between PredPol and the city of Richmond, California, a small city in the East
Bay.123
Richmond’s contract with PredPol was not a secret,124 but the details were
revealed somewhere else: federal trademark filings.125 PredPol filed a trademark
application for the PREDPOL mark on February 2, 2012 covering, in part,
“computer software for use in law enforcement and related business, namely,
computer software used for use in the analysis and determination of probable
locations where crimes will be committed with information delivery through
browser and portable device applications and map overlays” in Class 9.126
On December 13, 2012, PredPol submitted a specimen showing the PREDPOL
mark as used in commerce.127 The majority of the specimen appears to be
marketing materials explaining the mechanics of how PredPol works and the ways
in which it can benefit law enforcement.128 But, beginning on the third page,
PredPol submitted a contract that lays out the proposed terms for a PREDPOL
software deployment for the city of “Richmond, CA.”129 The contract begins by
explaining that “PredPol is glad to be working with you on decreasing the City’s
crime and looks forward to a very productive and successful relationship.”130
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The contract is dated August 2, 2012,131 and it identifies the financial
parameters for the agreement. It states that the “list price for a municipality the
size of Columbia is $75,000” and the “setup fee is…$15,000.”132 The contract
appears to provide Richmond with two discounts: “Columbia [sic] will receive a
33% discount on the annual subscription fee for PredPol, to $50,000 per year” and
the “setup fee will be waived.”133 The term of the subscription is three years.134
There is also a provision providing that “[a]dditional discounts in subsequent years
based on deployment of the tool across other, adjacent jurisdictions are
available.”135
The most shocking term of the contract is Richmond’s agreement to support
PredPol and its work in exchange for the discounted pricing.136 The contract states
that “City agrees to reasonably support PredPol’s research and development by
doing the following, during the term of this Agreement…[p]rovide public
testimonials and referrals to other agencies” and “[e]ngage in reasonable
joint/integrated marketing, including but not limited to press conferences and
media relations, training materials, marketing, tradeshows, conferences, speaking
engagements and research.”137 If any of the previously mentioned support would
“involve costs to the City outside of their normal costs for employees performing
their normal job duties, PredPol agrees to reimburse City for such costs. For
example, if a Chief is requested to attend and speak at a conference of Police
Chiefs to which they are not already traveling, PredPol agrees to reimburse City
for travel expenses, if requested.”138 The document is marked “CONFIDENTIAL”
at the bottom.139
Despite its apparent contractual agreement to support PredPol, the Richmond
Police Department terminated its relationship with the company in 2016, midway
through a multi-year contract, because the city found that there was no measurable
impact on crime reduction.140 It does not yet appear that journalists and civil
liberties organizations have filed public records requests to determine whether
Richmond received any additional discounts on its PredPol contract or took
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advantage of PredPol’s offer to reimburse travel expenses in exchange for
“reasonably supporting” PredPol’s research and development.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Surveillance transparency is tricky, but we need it more than ever. How can
we resist surveillance technologies, created by corporations and embraced by law
enforcement, when we are not aware of the threats? Using federal trademark
filings to investigate existing and future surveillance technologies offers
journalists, researchers, and civil society the opportunity to better understand
dangerous surveillance technologies and, hopefully, energize the public to mount
a resistance. By using federal trademark filings for surveillance transparency, we
can adopt one more way to resist an entrenched power dynamic: the watched can
become watchers.
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